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Items tagged with: privacy


 
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Private WhatsApp groups visible in Google searches

Your #WhatsApp groups may not be as secure as you think they are


Google is indexing invite links to private WhatsApp group chats. This means with a simple search anyone can discover and join these groups including ones the administrator may want to keep private.

Does #Google care about your privacy and security? No.

Does #Facebook honestly care about your privacy and security? No.

https://www.dw.com/en/private-whatsapp-groups-visible-in-google-searches/a-52468603

#Facebook #chat #apps #privacy #security #surveillance #messaging #im

 
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Private WhatsApp groups visible in Google searches

Your #WhatsApp groups may not be as secure as you think they are


Google is indexing invite links to private WhatsApp group chats. This means with a simple search anyone can discover and join these groups including ones the administrator may want to keep private.

Does #Google care about your privacy and security? No.

Does #Facebook honestly care about your privacy and security? No.

https://www.dw.com/en/private-whatsapp-groups-visible-in-google-searches/a-52468603

#Facebook #chat #apps #privacy #security #surveillance #messaging #im

 
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Private WhatsApp groups visible in Google searches

Your #WhatsApp groups may not be as secure as you think they are


Google is indexing invite links to private WhatsApp group chats. This means with a simple search anyone can discover and join these groups including ones the administrator may want to keep private.

Does #Google care about your privacy and security? No.

Does #Facebook honestly care about your privacy and security? No.

https://www.dw.com/en/private-whatsapp-groups-visible-in-google-searches/a-52468603

#Facebook #chat #apps #privacy #security #surveillance #messaging #im

 
Encryption backdoors must never be allowed. To prove that Tutanota is free from any backdoor, the entire client code is published as open source. Let's fight against mass surveillance! ✊
https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/why-a-backdoor-is-a-security-risk/
#privacy #dataprotection #datasecurity #security #encryption #surveillance #backdoors
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Discord Is Not An Acceptable Choice For Free Software Projects

It’s simple: free software projects should not use Discord. (This goes equally for any sort of public interest group.) Here’s why.

https://sneak.berlin/20200220/discord-is-not-an-acceptable-choice-for-free-software-projects/

#opensource #privacy
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'An issue of survival': Why Mozilla welcomes EU attempts to regulate the internet giants
The web is 'optimised for Chrome, not for independent browsers'

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/02/20/mozilla_eu_internet_regulation/
#mozilla #europe #eu #regulation #privacy

 
'An issue of survival': Why Mozilla welcomes EU attempts to regulate the internet giants
The web is 'optimised for Chrome, not for independent browsers'

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/02/20/mozilla_eu_internet_regulation/
#mozilla #europe #eu #regulation #privacy

 
Why Amazon Knows So Much About You

…One database contains transcriptions of all 31,082 interactions my family has had with the virtual assistant Alexa. Audio clips of the recordings are also provided. The 48 requests to play Let It Go, flag my daughter’s infatuation with Disney’s Frozen.
Other late-night music requests to the bedroom Echo, might provide a clue to a more adult activity…

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/CLQYZENMBI/amazon-data

#amazon #surveillanceCapitalism #dataAreLiability #privacy #bbc

 
Why Amazon Knows So Much About You

…One database contains transcriptions of all 31,082 interactions my family has had with the virtual assistant Alexa. Audio clips of the recordings are also provided. The 48 requests to play Let It Go, flag my daughter’s infatuation with Disney’s Frozen.
Other late-night music requests to the bedroom Echo, might provide a clue to a more adult activity…

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/CLQYZENMBI/amazon-data

#amazon #surveillanceCapitalism #dataAreLiability #privacy #bbc

 
Tutanota has been blocked in Russia to stop encrypted communication. This again shows, why we need to fight for privacy around the world. ✊ If you are affected, you can still access Tutanota with @torproject or a vpn. Here's more info:
https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/tutanota-blocked-russia
#privacy #surveillance #russia #censorship #freespeech

 
Fediverse, you've been holding out on me! I had no idea it was possible to view twitter without logging in over at nitter.net

Does anyone have a preference between a browser add-on redirect like [Invidition](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/invidition/) or a user space level program like [NitterizeMe](https://framagit.org/tom79/nitterizeme)?

#privacy

 
Minutes after we published this article, our site went down due to a DDOS attack. Coincidence? Read more and find out for yourself ;) #Privacy #Google #DontBeEvil ----> https://decentralize.today/decentralization/you-learned-the-abc-but-alphabet-learned-more-about-you-google-exposed
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SHA-1 is a Shambles

First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust


https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Below is the abstract from the article. The most concerning thing here is the ability to forge signatures of keys. As you know if you read my posts, I have always argued that we should never sign other people's keys. Even without the problem of possible forged signatures using the technique in the article, key-signing harms privacy.

The only key signature created by EasyGPG is the signature on a newly created key pair.

printf "${newkeyattr}" | env TZ=UTC gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --batch --use-agent --cert-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-cipher-algo "AES256" --s2k-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-mode 3 --s2k-count 32000000 --status-file "${temp}" --gen-key 2> /dev/null

Notice that SHA512 is used. As for signatures on messages and encrypted files, see below (after the abstract). EasyGPG always uses SHA512.

Abstract. The SHA-1 hash function was designed in 1995 and has been widely used
during two decades. A theoretical collision attack was first proposed in 2004 [WYY05],
but due to its high complexity it was only implemented in practice in 2017, using
a large GPU cluster [SBK + 17]. More recently, an almost practical chosen-prefix
collision attack against SHA-1 has been proposed [LP19]. This more powerful attack
allows to build colliding messages with two arbitrary prefixes, which is much more
threatening for real protocols.
In this paper, we report the first practical implementation of this attack, and its
impact on real-world security with a PGP/GnuPG impersonation attack. We managed
to significantly reduce the complexity of collisions attack against SHA-1: on an Nvidia
GTX 970, identical-prefix collisions can now be computed with a complexity of 2 61.2
rather than 2 64.7 , and chosen-prefix collisions with a complexity of 2 63.4 rather than
2 67.1 . When renting cheap GPUs, this translates to a cost of 11k US$ for a collision,
and 45k US$ for a chosen-prefix collision, within the means of academic researchers.
Our actual attack required two months of computations using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060
GPUs (we paid 75k US$ because GPU prices were higher, and we wasted some time
preparing the attack).
Therefore, the same attacks that have been practical on MD5 since 2009 are now
practical on SHA-1. In particular, chosen-prefix collisions can break signature schemes
and handshake security in secure channel protocols (TLS, SSH). We strongly advise
to remove SHA-1 from those type of applications as soon as possible.
We exemplify our cryptanalysis by creating a pair of PGP/GnuPG keys with different
identities, but colliding SHA-1 certificates. A SHA-1 certification of the first key can
therefore be transferred to the second key, leading to a forgery. This proves that
SHA-1 signatures now offers virtually no security in practice. The legacy branch of
GnuPG still uses SHA-1 by default for identity certifications, but after notifying the
authors, the modern branch now rejects SHA-1 signatures (the issue is tracked as
CVE-2019-14855).
Keywords:
$ grep "gpg" easygpg.sh | grep " -s " 
  encryptedText=`printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty -` 
  printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - | xclip -i -selection clipboard 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -a -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
    tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" - 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}" 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}"

#easygpg #gpg #encryption #privacy #surveillance #security #cryptography

 

SHA-1 is a Shambles

First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust


https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Below is the abstract from the article. The most concerning thing here is the ability to forge signatures of keys. As you know if you read my posts, I have always argued that we should never sign other people's keys. Even without the problem of possible forged signatures using the technique in the article, key-signing harms privacy.

The only key signature created by EasyGPG is the signature on a newly created key pair.

printf "${newkeyattr}" | env TZ=UTC gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --batch --use-agent --cert-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-cipher-algo "AES256" --s2k-digest-algo "SHA512" --s2k-mode 3 --s2k-count 32000000 --status-file "${temp}" --gen-key 2> /dev/null

Notice that SHA512 is used. As for signatures on messages and encrypted files, see below (after the abstract). EasyGPG always uses SHA512.

Abstract. The SHA-1 hash function was designed in 1995 and has been widely used
during two decades. A theoretical collision attack was first proposed in 2004 [WYY05],
but due to its high complexity it was only implemented in practice in 2017, using
a large GPU cluster [SBK + 17]. More recently, an almost practical chosen-prefix
collision attack against SHA-1 has been proposed [LP19]. This more powerful attack
allows to build colliding messages with two arbitrary prefixes, which is much more
threatening for real protocols.
In this paper, we report the first practical implementation of this attack, and its
impact on real-world security with a PGP/GnuPG impersonation attack. We managed
to significantly reduce the complexity of collisions attack against SHA-1: on an Nvidia
GTX 970, identical-prefix collisions can now be computed with a complexity of 2 61.2
rather than 2 64.7 , and chosen-prefix collisions with a complexity of 2 63.4 rather than
2 67.1 . When renting cheap GPUs, this translates to a cost of 11k US$ for a collision,
and 45k US$ for a chosen-prefix collision, within the means of academic researchers.
Our actual attack required two months of computations using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060
GPUs (we paid 75k US$ because GPU prices were higher, and we wasted some time
preparing the attack).
Therefore, the same attacks that have been practical on MD5 since 2009 are now
practical on SHA-1. In particular, chosen-prefix collisions can break signature schemes
and handshake security in secure channel protocols (TLS, SSH). We strongly advise
to remove SHA-1 from those type of applications as soon as possible.
We exemplify our cryptanalysis by creating a pair of PGP/GnuPG keys with different
identities, but colliding SHA-1 certificates. A SHA-1 certification of the first key can
therefore be transferred to the second key, leading to a forgery. This proves that
SHA-1 signatures now offers virtually no security in practice. The legacy branch of
GnuPG still uses SHA-1 by default for identity certifications, but after notifying the
authors, the modern branch now rejects SHA-1 signatures (the issue is tracked as
CVE-2019-14855).
Keywords:
$ grep "gpg" easygpg.sh | grep " -s " 
  encryptedText=`printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty -` 
  printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - | xclip -i -selection clipboard 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -a -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
      (tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" -e ${recipients} --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" -) | zenity --progress --text="Encrypting..." --pulsate --auto-close --no-cancel 
    tar --numeric-owner -c "$(basename "${filename}")" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always -s -u "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty --yes -o "${savepath}" - 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}" 
    printf "%s\n" "${theText}" | gpg --homedir "${keydir}" -a --trust-model always --textmode -s -u "${senderID}" -e -R "${senderID}" --no-emit-version --no-encrypt-to --personal-digest-preferences "SHA512 SHA384 SHA256" --personal-compress-preferences "ZLIB BZIP2 ZIP" --personal-cipher-preferences "AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 AES" --use-agent --no-tty - > "${savepath}"

#easygpg #gpg #encryption #privacy #surveillance #security #cryptography

 

Activate This ‘Bracelet of Silence,’ and Alexa Can’t Eavesdrop | The New York Times

Microphones and cameras lurk everywhere. You may want to slip on some privacy armor.
#technology #tech #security #privacy #Alexa #Amazon

 

Activate This ‘Bracelet of Silence,’ and Alexa Can’t Eavesdrop | The New York Times

Microphones and cameras lurk everywhere. You may want to slip on some privacy armor.
#technology #tech #security #privacy #Alexa #Amazon

 
Any EU based services (free as in freedom) you'd like to endorse, share with the masses? I find @codeberg very promising #privacy #freesoftware

 

Eifersuchtsdrama - USA / Huawei


US Regierungsbeamte sagten dem „Wall Street Journal“, Huawei könne nach Geheimdienstinformationen heimlich über eigentlich für Sicherheitsbehörden vorgesehene Schnittstellen auf Netze zugreifen.

https://futurezone.at/netzpolitik/usa-huawei-kann-ueber-hintertueren-auf-mobile-netze-zugreifen/400751826
#USA# Huawei #Sanktionen #Geheimdienst #Privacy

 
reCAPTCHA is one of many "free" systems that are seemingly helpful and innocent, but are actually part of the #Google data-collection ecosphere.

If you are a #website / app #developer, consider using tools & APIs that do not collect user & system information.

If you must use a particular system that integrates with reCAPTCHA or similar, please provide them feedback that you would like alternatives to Google services.

Users, choose to solicit sites that value your #privacy and user data.

 

Hong Kong Protestors Using Bridgefy (iOS and Android) Messaging App China Can't Block


Content warning: How do you communicate when the government censors the internet? With a peer-to-peer mesh broadcasting network that doesn't use the internet. That's exactly what Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters have been doing, thanks to San Francisco startup Bridgefy'


 
Sollte man konsequente #Verschlüsselung aufheben um die Verfolgung von z.B. Kindesmissbrauch zu erleichtern wenn man gewährleisten kann, dass dadurch nicht massenhaft Daten zur #Profilbildung gesammelt werden?

#Frage #Diskussion #Facebook #Privacy

https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/apps/kinderschuetzer-wollen-facebook-von-verschluesselung-abhalten-a-1df8d922-16ff-43be-9aa0-9b5111a6c8e6#ref=rss

 
#Briar – new kid on the (messaging app) block - Review
This is more than just another #WhatsApp alternative.

For once, this doesn't rely just on having an internet connection, but also sends and receives messages via WiFi and Bluetooth.
https://decentralize.today/privacy/briar-new-kid-on-the-messaging-app-block-review
#privacy
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GNU Icecat and Google: be very careful!

Your native (inner) search plugin sends your REAL UA


For example (disabled by default: javascript, cookies, referers and a lot of different options in about:config + fake UA)... but the result of the empty request is:

https://www.google.com/search?client=icecat-b-e&q=

P.S. The ability to enable my own "clear" old plugin such as:
<SearchPlugin xmlns="[url=http://www.mozilla.org/2006/browser/search/]http://www.mozilla.org/2006/browser/search/[/url]" xmlns:os="[url=http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/]http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/[/url]"> 
<os:ShortName>Google (SSL)</os:ShortName> 
<os:Description>Google (SSL)</os:Description> 
<os:InputEncoding>UTF-8</os:InputEncoding> 
<SearchForm>[url=https://www.google.com/</SearchForm>]https://www.google.com/</SearchForm>[/url] 
<os:Url type="text/html" method="GET" template="[url=https://www.google.com/search]https://www.google.com/search[/url]"> 
  <os:Param name="q" value="{searchTerms}"/> 
  <os:Param name="ie" value="utf-8"/> 
  <os:Param name="oe" value="utf-8"/> 
</os:Url> 
</SearchPlugin>

... was blocked by bloody Mozilla! Fuck your search.json.mozlz4!

#gnu #linux #icecat #gnuzilla #web #internet #www #privacy #security #browser #mozilla #firefox #user-agent #ua #search #plugin #google

 
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GNU Icecat and Google: be very careful!

Your native (inner) search plugin sends your REAL UA


For example (disabled by default: javascript, cookies, referers and a lot of different options in about:config + fake UA)... but the result of the empty request is:

https://www.google.com/search?client=icecat-b-e&q=

P.S. The ability to enable my own "clear" old plugin such as:
<SearchPlugin xmlns="[url=http://www.mozilla.org/2006/browser/search/]http://www.mozilla.org/2006/browser/search/[/url]" xmlns:os="[url=http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/]http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/[/url]"> 
<os:ShortName>Google (SSL)</os:ShortName> 
<os:Description>Google (SSL)</os:Description> 
<os:InputEncoding>UTF-8</os:InputEncoding> 
<SearchForm>[url=https://www.google.com/</SearchForm>]https://www.google.com/</SearchForm>[/url] 
<os:Url type="text/html" method="GET" template="[url=https://www.google.com/search]https://www.google.com/search[/url]"> 
  <os:Param name="q" value="{searchTerms}"/> 
  <os:Param name="ie" value="utf-8"/> 
  <os:Param name="oe" value="utf-8"/> 
</os:Url> 
</SearchPlugin>

... was blocked by bloody Mozilla! Fuck your search.json.mozlz4!

#gnu #linux #icecat #gnuzilla #web #internet #www #privacy #security #browser #mozilla #firefox #user-agent #ua #search #plugin #google

 
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DDGR - DuckDuck + GNU/Linux Console


I like this project!

Features
  • Fast and clean; custom color
  • Designed for maximum readability at minimum space
  • Instant answers (supported by DDG html version)
  • Custom number of results per page
  • Navigation, browser integration
  • Search and option completion scripts (Bash, Fish, Zsh)
  • DuckDuckGo Bangs (along with completion)
  • Open the first result in browser (I'm Feeling Ducky)
  • REPL for continuous searches
  • Keywords (e.g. filetype:mime, site:somesite.com)
  • Limit search by time, specify region, disable safe search
  • HTTPS proxy support
  • Disable User Agent
  • Do Not Track set by default
  • Supports custom url handler script or cmdline utility
  • Privacy-aware (no unconfirmed user data collection)
  • Thoroughly documented, man page with examples
  • Minimal dependencies
For the best usability, you can create a very simple alias for .bashrc. For example:
alias duck='ddgr --num=20 --expand --reg=il-he --nocolor --noua --proxy=localhost:8118'
  • num = number of results fetched per page
  • reg = home region
  • noua = no user-agent
  • proxy = (host:port - Privoxy and Onion, etc.)
By default, my real user agent is: ddgr/1.6 (textmode; Linux x86_64; 1024x768), but with --noua option ddgr generates (on-the-fly) different fake UA:

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/39.0
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.104 Safari/537.36 Core/1.53.2372.400 QQBrowser/9.5.11096.400
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/38.0.2125.104 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 9.0; en-US)

Some interesting options:
positional arguments: 

  KEYWORD               search keywords 

optional arguments: 

  -n N, --num N         show N (0<=N<=25) results per page (default 10); N=0 
                        shows actual number of results fetched per page 
  -r REG, --reg REG     region-specific search e.g. 'us-en' for US (default); 
  -t SPAN, --time SPAN  time limit search [d (1 day), w (1 wk), m (1 month)] 
  -w SITE, --site SITE  search sites using DuckDuckGo 
  -x, --expand          Show complete url in search results 
  -p URI, --proxy URI   tunnel traffic through an HTTPS proxy; URI format: 
                        [http[s]://][user:pwd@]host[:port] 
  --unsafe              disable safe search 
  --noua                disable user agent 


omniprompt keys: 

  n, p, f               fetch the next, prev or first set of search results 
  index                 open the result corresponding to index in browser 
  c index               copy url to clipboard 
  q, ^D, double Enter   exit ddgr 
  ?                     show omniprompt help 
  \*                     other inputs are considered as new search keywords

MORE: https://github.com/jarun/ddgr

#privacy #security #freedom #GNU #Linux #console #terminal #bash #Duckduckgo #search #man #manual #proxy #user-agent #browser

 
Bild/Foto

DDGR - DuckDuck + GNU/Linux Console


I like this project!

Features
  • Fast and clean; custom color
  • Designed for maximum readability at minimum space
  • Instant answers (supported by DDG html version)
  • Custom number of results per page
  • Navigation, browser integration
  • Search and option completion scripts (Bash, Fish, Zsh)
  • DuckDuckGo Bangs (along with completion)
  • Open the first result in browser (I'm Feeling Ducky)
  • REPL for continuous searches
  • Keywords (e.g. filetype:mime, site:somesite.com)
  • Limit search by time, specify region, disable safe search
  • HTTPS proxy support
  • Disable User Agent
  • Do Not Track set by default
  • Supports custom url handler script or cmdline utility
  • Privacy-aware (no unconfirmed user data collection)
  • Thoroughly documented, man page with examples
  • Minimal dependencies
For the best usability, you can create a very simple alias for .bashrc. For example:
alias duck='ddgr --num=20 --expand --reg=il-he --nocolor --noua --proxy=localhost:8118'
  • num = number of results fetched per page
  • reg = home region
  • noua = no user-agent
  • proxy = (host:port - Privoxy and Onion, etc.)
By default, my real user agent is: ddgr/1.6 (textmode; Linux x86_64; 1024x768), but with --noua option ddgr generates (on-the-fly) different fake UA:

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/39.0
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.104 Safari/537.36 Core/1.53.2372.400 QQBrowser/9.5.11096.400
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/38.0.2125.104 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 9.0; en-US)

Some interesting options:
positional arguments: 

  KEYWORD               search keywords 

optional arguments: 

  -n N, --num N         show N (0<=N<=25) results per page (default 10); N=0 
                        shows actual number of results fetched per page 
  -r REG, --reg REG     region-specific search e.g. 'us-en' for US (default); 
  -t SPAN, --time SPAN  time limit search [d (1 day), w (1 wk), m (1 month)] 
  -w SITE, --site SITE  search sites using DuckDuckGo 
  -x, --expand          Show complete url in search results 
  -p URI, --proxy URI   tunnel traffic through an HTTPS proxy; URI format: 
                        [http[s]://][user:pwd@]host[:port] 
  --unsafe              disable safe search 
  --noua                disable user agent 


omniprompt keys: 

  n, p, f               fetch the next, prev or first set of search results 
  index                 open the result corresponding to index in browser 
  c index               copy url to clipboard 
  q, ^D, double Enter   exit ddgr 
  ?                     show omniprompt help 
  \*                     other inputs are considered as new search keywords

MORE: https://github.com/jarun/ddgr

#privacy #security #freedom #GNU #Linux #console #terminal #bash #Duckduckgo #search #man #manual #proxy #user-agent #browser

 
@z428 @benni
Gestern, ein Gespräch im Cafe der psychiatrischen Karl Jaspers Klinik. Der Besuchte und zwei Besucher. Das Gespräch geht um #Privacy #Conversations #xmpp #jabber #Gajim
was der Besuchte & /me benutzen. Besucher zwei zu mir, nach ausführlicher Erklärung, warum die Nutzung von W.A. grade im Falle eines Psychoklinikbesuches keine superschlaue Idee ist: "Wie heisst das Ding? Schick mir das mal mit Whatsapp."
#Schreibtischkantenaufstrich

 
An die Adressen milieuinterner Konkurrenten, potenzieller Opfer oder behördlicher Gegner kommen Clan-Männer mitunter, ohne dass sie über Spitzel in der Polizei verfügen müssen. Milieukenner berichten, dass sich in den Großfamilien meist ein Cousin, eine Nichte oder ein Onkel findet, der bei einem Mobilfunkanbieter, einer Autovermietung oder einer Hausverwaltung arbeitet. Da hierzulande fast jeder in einer solchen Datei registriert ist, können zu Namen entsprechende Anschriften gefunden werden.
#datenschutz #privacy #polizei #kriminalität #omeirat-clan #tagesspiegel #mobilfunk

 
Simon Weckert - Google Maps Hacks

99 #smartphones are transported in a handcart to generate virtual #traffic #jam in #Google #Maps. Through this activity, it is possible to turn a green #street red which has an impact in the physical #world by #navigating #cars on another route!




http://www.simonweckert.com/googlemapshacks.html

#googlemapshacks #arts #Performance #Installation #surveillance #privacy #navigation

 
Simon Weckert - Google Maps Hacks

99 #smartphones are transported in a handcart to generate virtual #traffic #jam in #Google #Maps. Through this activity, it is possible to turn a green #street red which has an impact in the physical #world by #navigating #cars on another route!




http://www.simonweckert.com/googlemapshacks.html

#googlemapshacks #arts #Performance #Installation #surveillance #privacy #navigation

 
Simon Weckert - Google Maps Hacks

99 #smartphones are transported in a handcart to generate virtual #traffic #jam in #Google #Maps. Through this activity, it is possible to turn a green #street red which has an impact in the physical #world by #navigating #cars on another route!




http://www.simonweckert.com/googlemapshacks.html

#googlemapshacks #arts #Performance #Installation #surveillance #privacy #navigation

 
99 #smartphones are transported in a handcart to generate virtual #traffic #jam in #Google #Maps. Through this activity, it is possible to turn a green #street red which has an impact in the physical #world by #navigating #cars on another route!

http://www.simonweckert.com/googlemapshacks.html

#googlemapshacks #arts #Performance #Installation #surveillance #privacy #navigation

 
Warum ich zufriedener Kunde bei #mailboxorg bin: "Wir sehen es als unsere Aufgabe an, hier aus grundsätzlichen gesellschaftlichen Erwägungen diesem Treiben etwas entgegen zu setzen und für eine freie, sichere Kommunikation einzutreten." #privacy #censorship
https://mailbox.org/de/post/russische-aufsichtsbehoerde-roskomnadsor-beantragt-sperre-von-mailbox-org-vor-gericht

 

Russia blocks encrypted email service ProtonMail - Reuters

Russia said on Wednesday it had blocked the Swiss email service ProtonMail, popular among journalists and activists for its focus on user privacy and high level of encryption.

Russian communications watchdog Roskomnadzor said ProtonMail, which uses end-to-end encryption to protect user data, had been used to send fake, anonymous bomb threats.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-protonmail/russia-blocks-encrypted-email-service-protonmail-idUSKBN1ZS1K8

With this lame excuse we can see that ProtonMail is reliable product.
#privacy #internet #software

 

Russia blocks encrypted email service ProtonMail - Reuters

Russia said on Wednesday it had blocked the Swiss email service ProtonMail, popular among journalists and activists for its focus on user privacy and high level of encryption.

Russian communications watchdog Roskomnadzor said ProtonMail, which uses end-to-end encryption to protect user data, had been used to send fake, anonymous bomb threats.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-protonmail/russia-blocks-encrypted-email-service-protonmail-idUSKBN1ZS1K8

With this lame excuse we can see that ProtonMail is reliable product.
#privacy #internet #software

 
#Privacy #Tracking
Ring Doorbell App Packed with Third-Party Trackers

by Bill Budington

 
Web browsers need to improve for a better #privacy !

Recent exemples:
1- most of the time your web browser has a 99.99% unique footprint which means that websites don't need any cookie to track you. Check for yourself at:
https://amiunique.org

@Firefox @googlechrome @brave

 

Leaked Documents Expose the Secretive Market for Your Web Browsing Data


Source: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdkq7/avast-antivirus-sells-user-browsing-data-investigation
They show that the #Avast #antivirus program installed on a person's #computer collects data, and that Jumpshot repackages it into various different products that are then sold to many of the largest companies in the world.
#news #warning #internet #economy #web #browser #surfing #privacy #security #fail

 

Leaked Documents Expose the Secretive Market for Your Web Browsing Data


Source: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdkq7/avast-antivirus-sells-user-browsing-data-investigation
They show that the #Avast #antivirus program installed on a person's #computer collects data, and that Jumpshot repackages it into various different products that are then sold to many of the largest companies in the world.
#news #warning #internet #economy #web #browser #surfing #privacy #security #fail

 

Leaked Documents Expose the Secretive Market for Your Web Browsing Data - VICE

An antivirus program used by hundreds of millions of people around the world is selling highly sensitive web browsing data to many of the world's biggest companies, a joint investigation by Motherboard and PCMag has found. Our report relies on leaked user data, contracts, and other company documents that show the sale of this data is both highly sensitive and is in many cases supposed to remain confidential between the company selling the data and the clients purchasing it.
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdkq7/avast-antivirus-sells-user-browsing-data-investigation
#privacy

 

Leaked Documents Expose the Secretive Market for Your Web Browsing Data - VICE

An antivirus program used by hundreds of millions of people around the world is selling highly sensitive web browsing data to many of the world's biggest companies, a joint investigation by Motherboard and PCMag has found. Our report relies on leaked user data, contracts, and other company documents that show the sale of this data is both highly sensitive and is in many cases supposed to remain confidential between the company selling the data and the clients purchasing it.
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdkq7/avast-antivirus-sells-user-browsing-data-investigation
#privacy

 
Bild/Foto

Resist Facial Recognition

The Police State


Facial recognition cameras scan every adult and child within range to make biometric maps of their faces – more like fingerprints than photographs. These are then compared to images on secretive watchlists.

Watchlist images can be of anyone and come from anywhere, including social media.

Police have used facial recognition to track people who are not suspected of any wrongdoing.

https://liberty.e-activist.com/page/50456/petition/1?chain

#FacialRecognition #PoliceState #LostDemocracy #LostFreedom #DystopianBritain #Orwell #Orwellian #petition #dystopian #privacy #PoliceAbuse #GovernmentalTerrorism #SocialMedia #photos #pictures #surveillance

 
Bild/Foto

Resist Facial Recognition

The Police State


Facial recognition cameras scan every adult and child within range to make biometric maps of their faces – more like fingerprints than photographs. These are then compared to images on secretive watchlists.

Watchlist images can be of anyone and come from anywhere, including social media.

Police have used facial recognition to track people who are not suspected of any wrongdoing.

https://liberty.e-activist.com/page/50456/petition/1?chain

#FacialRecognition #PoliceState #LostDemocracy #LostFreedom #DystopianBritain #Orwell #Orwellian #petition #dystopian #privacy #PoliceAbuse #GovernmentalTerrorism #SocialMedia #photos #pictures #surveillance

 

Facebook is not good for you...


https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/z3beea/facebook-moderators-lawsuit-ptsd-trauma-tracking-bathroom-breaks

"Despite Facebook’s push for secrecy, Zaicev is now among dozens of current and former moderators who have contacted Coleman Legal Partners in Dublin about bringing legal action against the company for failing to provide a safe work environment. Unlike a recent class action case in the U.S., each moderator has to file a separate case in Ireland.

“The happiest people are the people who are away from Facebook. The more unhappy you are in life, the more you are going to spend on Facebook,” one fomer moderator who is preparing a legal action against Facebook told VICE News. “And we spent the whole fricking day on Facebook. We can probably guess that it is not good for you.”"

#facebook #happiness #security #privacy #gnu #linux #gnulinux #deletefacebook